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Gujarat Carnage 2002
A Report To the Nation by An Independent Fact Finding
Mission: Dr. Kamal Mitra Chenoy,
S.P.Shukla, K.S. Subramanian and Achin Vanaik
INDEX
SECTION 1. The Sabarmati Express
Incident, Godhra
Conclusions
Box 1: A History of Communal
Riots in Gujarat
SECTION 2. The Use of the Godhra
Incident for anti-Muslim Mobilisation
Gujarat Carnage
2002
A Report To the
Nation
by
An Independent Fact Finding
Mission:
Dr. Kamal Mitra Chenoy,
S.P.Shukla, K.S. Subramanian and Achin Vanaik
Acknowledgements
This Report would not have been possible
without the extensive support and generous contributions from
citizens and groups in Gujarat and Delhi. We are grateful for their
help. <Back To
Top>
Introduction
An independent fact finding mission
consisting of Dr. Kamal Mitra Chenoy, Associate Professor, School of
International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; S.P.
Shukla, IAS [retd.], former Finance Secretary of India & former
Member, Planning Commission; K.S. Subramanian, IPS [retd.], former
Director General of Police, Tripura; and Achin Vanaik, Visiting
Professor, Third World Academy, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, was
set up to investigate the Gujarat carnage of February-March 2002.
The terms of reference of the fact finding mission were to find out
the truth of the Godhra incident in which a bogie of the Sabarmati
Express was burnt and 58 people were killed, the possible use of
this tragic incident in regard to the communal conflagration that
followed, and to ascertain whether there was any official complicity
in that conflagration, and if so, to what extent. The findings of
this mission will be presented to the Concerned Citizens’ Tribunal
set up in Gujarat.
In this connection, the team visited
Ahmedabad and Godhra from March 22nd to March 26th 2002. We met a
large number of victims of the communal violence, eyewitnesses,
administrative and police people [serving and retired], journalists,
judges, lawyers, NGO and civil society activists, relief camp
managers, and others. In view of the sensitive nature of the
information provided and the fact that violence continues in
Gujarat, the names of all those who interacted with us and gave
information and views are not being disclosed. <Back
To Top>
SECTION 1: The Sabarmati Express Incident, Godhra
The tragic communal killings on the
Sabarmati Express on February 27th, 2002 were preceded by repeated
incidents of provocation and harassment of Muslim passengers by kar
sewaks travelling by the train on the preceding days. The Jan Morcha
[Faizabad] daily in a report of February 24th detailed instances of
misbehaviour by kar sewaks who allegedly hit and threatened Muslim
passengers with iron rods, insisted that they shout “jai Shri Ram,”
and forcibly unveiled Muslim women. Many persons in Ahmedabad and
Godhra also reported such instances. Since such communally inspired
and provocative behaviour was commonly known, it is strange that as
the National Human Rights Commission [NHRC] in its Interim Report
has also observed, no action including a police escort, was taken at
the time, in view of the known communally charged atmosphere in
Godhra. We will deal with this administrative lapse in the third
section on “State Complicity?” below.
In the
whole of Gujarat, there was communal tension because of the
Vishwa Hindu Parishad’s [VHP] publicly announced programme of ‘shila
pujan’ on March 15th, 2002. In view of its earlier history of
communal violence, which commenced even prior to Partition, and the
episodic communal outbreaks after the major riots of 1969, Gujarat
is a particularly vulnerable and sensitive State. Even though a
compromise with the VHP was arrived at, before the events in
question communal tensions remained, and wide sections of the
Gujarati populace were apprehensive of the future.
Godhra is a small town with a roughly
equal population of Muslims and Hindus, and a long and bloody
history of communal tension and violence. The Muslims of the Singal
Faliya area near the railway station, who allegedly attacked the
Sabarmati Express with tragic consequences, are ‘Ghanchis’ a
largely uneducated and poor community, a large number of whom are
reportedly ‘tabliquis’ of the Deobandi tradition, who have been
active participants in earlier rounds of communal violence.
The Sabarmati Express [9166 UP] was due
at 2.55 AM on the early morning of February 27th at Godhra station.
There had reportedly been instances of misbehaviour with Muslim
passengers on the train en route. One Muslim family that refused to
shout slogans of “jai Shri Ram,” was according to informants,
forced to disembark from the train at the dead of night. It is
claimed that the train guard phoned his superiors from Meghnagar
that kar sewaks were carrying explosive material in coach number S6.
While we were unable to get confirmation of this particular report,
it appears there was communal tension on the train well before it
reached Godhra.
The Sabarmati Express was late, not an
uncommon event, and arrived in Godhra on platform number 1, almost
five hours late at 7.43 AM instead of the scheduled time 2.55 AM. In
view of the large number of passengers, which included an estimated
1700 kar sewaks, the vendors including unlicensed Ghanchi vendors
who slip into the railway station to sell tea and snacks, decided to
raise the rate to Rs. 5 a cup. Some kar sewaks refused to pay for
the tea and snacks and got into an altercation with the vendors. An
old Ghanchi vendor, who is absconding, was ordered to shout pro-Rama
slogans and his beard was reportedly pulled when he refused. This
was followed immediately by stone throwing and physical assaults
started. A Muslim lady Jaitinbibi was waiting for the train to
Vadodara [Baroda] scheduled at around 8 AM along with her two young
daughters, Sophiya and Shahidi. On seeing the fracas, they tried to
leave the station. While doing this, they were stopped by a kar
sewak who grabbed one of the teenaged daughters Sophiya and tried to
drag her inside the compartment, but contrary to later press reports
and rumours failed to do so. Subsequently this family left for
Vadodora, but a journalist who spoke with them and has photocopies
of their railway tickets, confirmed the story to us. Another
informant who spoke to Sophiya’s relative in Godhra, where the
family had come to spend Id with relatives, also confirmed these
particulars.
The fracas on the platform lasted around
15 to 20 minutes before the train began to pull out. But the
emergency chain was pulled in one of the three front general
compartment bogies of the 16 bogie train, [bogies S5 and S6 were
eleventh and twelfth respectively in this chain] and it
stopped briefly when the last bogie, also a general compartment,
was, by various accounts, in front of the main exit gate of the
platform. After a few minutes, it moved to less than a kilometre
from the platform and was stopped again by an emergency chain being
pulled, this time reportedly in coaches S5 or S6. Apparently
incensed by reports of the misbehaviour with members of their
community by the kar sewaks and the molestation, even rumoured
abduction, of a Muslim woman, a mob of up to 2,000 people allegedly
of Ghanchis from Singal Faliya attacked the train with stones and
fire bombs. The kar sewaks of almost equal strength threw stones
back. The main target of the Ghanchi mob appears to have been coach
S6 which was badly burnt and in which 58 passengers, including 26
women, 12 children and 20 men died. The attack is estimated to have
taken place between 8.05 and 8.15 AM. In comparison the adjoining
coach, S5 was not badly damaged, with only a few windows
broken.
Since the spot is just a little more than
a stone’s throw from the station and in clear sight the Government
Railway Police [GRP] jawans reached the spot within minutes. But,
for reasons unknown, they made no effort to fire warning shots to
disperse the mob. Their role will be examined later in Section 3
below. The arrival of the firefighters was allegedly delayed by a
local leader, who led a mob that detained a fire engine
briefly.
By the time the District Superintendent
of Police [DSP] reached the site by 8.30 AM, the mob had dispersed.
Since he heard no cries or any sounds from coach S6, he had no
apprehensions of massive civilian casualties in that coach. This was
discovered only later when the District Collector entered the coach.
Reportedly, all the bodies were in a heap in the centre of the coach
S6.
The enraged kar sewaks learning of
the civilian deaths caused by the ghastly burning of coach S6
then tried to attack a nearby mosque in Singal Faliya. The
police fired 30 tear gas shells and fourteen rounds of live
bullets to disperse the mob of kar sewaks. The damaged coaches
S5 and S6 were detached, and the train departed with the rest of
the passengers at 12.40 PM. According to informants, some kar
sewaks in the Sabarmati Express on the way back stabbed 2 or 3
people at the Vadodara railway station, giving a clear warning
of things to come. The inquest and post-mortem of all the
recovered bodies was undertaken by 4.30 PM. Under instructions
from the administration in Ahmedabad, all the bodies, excluding
5 that were of passengers from the Godhra region or that side of
Gujarat, were dispatched to the Civil Hospital, at Sola,
Ahmedabad. The arrival of the dead bodies in Ahmedabad, and
their consequent funeral, could have been expected to worsen an
already inflamed situation. We will discuss this in Section
3 below. <Back
To Top>
Certain
questions arise about the tragic
burning in Godhra. Why did the residents of Singal Faliya attack the
train? Was this attack preplanned? If it wasn’t, how did a mob of
up to 2,000 gather at such short notice? If the attack was
preplanned, was it by a foreign agency, as claimed shortly
thereafter by Chief Minister Narendra Modi, and later by Union Home
Minister LK Advani? Why did the mob attack with deadly weapons like
fire bombs? Why did it specifically attack coach S6? Why did the
coach burn so rapidly so that as many as 58 passengers could not
escape? With 4 exits available: 2 coach doors on the side away from
the attacking mob, and the 2 vestibule exits to the adjoining
coaches, why did so many passengers get trapped? Why weren’t
concerted efforts made to rescue them by passengers of the adjoining
coaches, and the hundreds of kar sewaks? Who pulled the emergency
chains and why?
The authorities and all informed persons
in Godhra were quite categorical that there was no significant
evidence to prove any ‘foreign hand’ in the tragedy. Because
trouble had started at the railway station itself, by the time the
train reached Singal Faliya some fifteen minutes later, the mob had
had sufficient time to gather from the nearby houses and jhuggies.
There is a large slum in the Singal Faliya area where as many as 15
to 20 persons live in a single jhuggi, literally sleeping in shifts.
District authorities were not at all surprised that such a large
crowd gathered at the spot in such a short time. Several informants
in Godhra confirmed that this was not improbable. Fire-bombs, iron
rods, etc. are all available in ready supply in various localities
because of the history and incidence of communal outbreaks in Godhra.
This was particularly so for Singal
Faliya because of the presence of auto-repair workers, rickshaw
pullers, auto-rickshaw drivers, small time wagon-breakers and
criminal elements reportedly living in the slum. So the collection
of a large mob at a short notice and the availability of improvised
petrol bombs and other weapons and implements, by themselves, do not
support the theory of any deep-rooted conspiracy, with or without
support of the foreign agencies. One version is that some of the
Singal Faliya residents such as tea vendors or rickshaw
pullers/drivers who were present at the platform and were witness to
the incidents/altercations that allegedly took place on arrival of
the train, had rushed to the Singal Faliya basti with the
news/rumour that a Muslim woman had been molested, even abducted,
and that this led to excitement and uproar and the enraged mob that
carried out the murderous attack.
The focussed attack on coach S6 also
suggests that rumour had it that the perpetrators of the alleged
crime were in that coach. But all this will remain conjecture, until
more evidence is collected. It also appears that since the bulk of
the casualties were women and children, and relatively few (only 20)
able bodied men, that all kar sevaks on the train were not targeted
but only those in coach S6. Otherwise, why weren’t other coaches
filled with kar sevaks, of which there were another 14 excluding the
adjoining coach S5, also attacked with fire bombs and the
like?
We examined coaches S5 and S6. While S5
was less badly damaged with some windows broken, coach S6 was
completely burnt out inside the compartment. Some reports have it
that passengers were carrying kerosene stoves to cook during the
long journey from Faizabad to Ahmedabad, along with other
inflammable items. While this is not unusual or implausible, this
must remain speculation until the forensic evidence is in. It is
estimated that there must have been around 150 people in the
compartment, largely kar sewaks, and once the fire started, the able
bodied kar sevaks must have fled first. Knowledgeable informants in
Godhra surmised that the 38 women and children along with the
20 men might have been rendered unconscious by the smoke and carbon
monoxide confined inside the coach, since most of the windows and
both doors on one side were closed, and later asphyxiated by the
smoke or burnt by the fire that swept the coach. But this can only
be confirmed by forensic evidence, and accounts by other passengers
from coach S6 who survived.
But despite incomplete evidence and
differing versions, it is clear that this monstrous crime was not
preplanned as claimed by high quarters immediately after the
tragedy. At most, according to a number of informants, some
passengers with access to a mobile phone may have called contacts in
Godhra/Singal Faliya from a relatively nearby station like Ratlam,
Dahod or Meghnagar, thus giving at most a few hours notice. But as
we have stated above, given the prevailing circumstances and
context, it was probable that a large armed mob collected after
the fracas at the Godhra railway station platform. There was
sufficient time for an armed mob to collect after the events at the
railway station. As the train was scheduled to arrive at 2.55 AM,
any premeditated assault should have led to the mob gathering at
Singal Faliya about that time, instead of five hours later. On the
other hand, before 8 AM in the morning, most adults and young males
living in Singal Faliya would not have not gone to work and were
easily available on call, as it were, to gather near Cabin A where
the train had stopped.
Though by all accounts there was some
provocation by the kar sewaks starting well before Godhra, this
cannot serve to exonerate this inhuman and horrendous crime. As for
the emergency chain pulling, it is plausible that the first chain
pulling as the train was moving out from the station was by the kar
sewaks to enable those left behind, perhaps involved in the
commotion on the platform, to catch the train. The second instance,
and that too from coaches S5 or S6, is more
perplexing.
The outrage occasioned by this
tragedy and subsequent police action has led most eyewitnesses
to disappear, abscond or feign ignorance. We interviewed vendors
from platform number 2 at Godhra station. They all claimed to
have noticed nothing as they were on an adjacent platform. But
since they, on their own admission, would have been aware of the
commotion, if any, on platform 1, and would have had an
unimpeded view of the area near Cabin A where the train was
attacked, they obviously decided to remain silent. The vendors
on platform 1 present on February 27th were absent and had been
so since the incident. Some of the eyewitnesses and participants
are obviously in custody. Others are missing. Still others are
silent, or claim to know nothing. <Back
To Top>
This notwithstanding, major conclusions can be arrived
at:
1] The attack does not appear to be
pre-planned in the sense in which it was claimed publicly by high
authorities in the immediate aftermath of the incident of 27th
Feb. Neither available information nor the circumstances then
prevailing provide support to the theory of any deep-rooted
conspiracy, with or without involvement of foreign
agencies.
2] It was an instance of a ghastly
communal riot, in a place that has a long
history of communal riots.
3] The tragedy could have been averted
or at least, minimised if strong preventive measures had been
taken in the wake of the communal incidents/irritants that were
taking place on the train route and which could have been
anticipated once the kar sewaks started leaving/returning by train
in large numbers for/from Ayodhya [This will be examined
below in Section 3]. <Back
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SECTION 2: The Use of the Godhra Incident for anti-Muslim
Mobilisation
Political And Media Reactions
There was massive media reaction to the
Godhra tragedy. With the spread of electronic media and cable TV,
the horrific pictures of the devastation in coach S6, the gruesome
death of innocent women and children reportedly returning from
homage to Lord Rama because of an inhuman, unprovoked and
premeditated assault, was the staple of media coverage. While there
has been criticism of the national print and electronic media [the
dominant English and Hindi dailies and television channels]
including by the Gujarat government, the role of sections of the
Gujarati language press was in reality incendiary. The Gujarati
daily Sandesh, for instance, reported on March 1st that two
Hindu women had been abducted from the train by Muslims, gangraped,
mutilated with their breasts cut off, then killed with their bodies
dumped in Kalol near Godhra. It also reported rumours of a third
body being found. [See
Box 4]. The police investigated the story, searched the village
and found the story baseless. But the publication of such baseless
stories in the press inflamed public opinion. Sandesh has
been held by most commentators to be a major offender.
Such inflammatory stories were not new.
Three years earlier such stories had appeared during the
anti-Christian violence in the tribal-dominated Dangs district, of
Gujarat. There has been therefore, a long standing tendency in
sections of the Gujarati language press to publish communally
inflammatory reports. Such reports are actionable. Under the law of
the land such reportage that causes animosity between communities is
a criminal offence. Despite such provisions in the law, no action
was taken. While the State government did ban some local TV
channels, it took no action against newspapers like Sandesh.
In this backdrop, the sensationalist and inflammatory reporting
after the Godhra incident, with its gory consequences, was only to
be expected. The Press Council was forced to issue a strong
statement on the role of the media. On 3rd April, Justice K.
Jayachandra Reddy, Chairman, was sharply critical of the media
noting “with anguish that a large number of newspapers and news
channels in the country and, in particular a large section of the
print and electronic media in Gujarat has, instead of alleviating
communal unrest, played an ignoble role in inciting communal
passions leading to large scale rioting, arson and pillage in the
state concerned.” He warned the erring media of action under
Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code and allied provisions.
The centrality accorded to Godhra
by influential sections of the media only echoed statements at the
highest level of Government. Chief Minister Modi repeatedly referred
to the communal violence that followed as a “reaction” and
likened it to Newton’s third law of dynamics. The fact that the
Chief Minister immediately branded the event as ISI and
Pakistani-inspired, followed by Union Home Minister Advani, in the
absence of any evidence or inquiry, further inflamed the situation.
Even if the Chief Minister’s intention was to shift the blame away
from local Muslims, as some supporters claim, it had the opposite
effect. The accusation branded the local Ghanchi Muslims as
Pakistani agents, in other words, as agents of a long standing enemy
power, thereby conforming to the traditional demonisation of Indian
Muslims as sympathisers and cohorts of Pakistan. This wholly
unsubstantiated vilification was already widespread in the State but
was to become the staple of later propaganda and the legitimation of
the ruthless assaults on Muslims and their property.
To cite only a few of the many instances,
State Health Minister Ashok Bhatt speaking to the media in Godhra on
27th February stated that, “Godhra has a notorious reputation,”
and alleged that, “We suspect that many Pakistanis live here
illegally.” Thus the equation was complete: Godhra was a
preplanned Pakistani act carried out by local Muslims. The Minister
of State for Home Gordhan Zadaphia, a senior VHP activist, confirmed
the linkage alleging, “The bogie burning is a terrorist act
similar to the attack on the American Centre in Kolkata. The
culprits in both cases are the same.” Through the media he
delivered a dire threat: “We will teach a lesson to those who have
done this. No one will be spared and we will make sure that the
forces behind this act will never dare to repeat it.”
Zadaphia also played to religious
sentiments by stressing that “Most of the people who died were
members of the VHP [Vishva Hindu Parishad]. Many of the dead
children were returning from Ayodhya.” He also made his
allegiances clear by publicly differing with Prime Minister Vajpayee
and Union Home Minister Advani’s call to the VHP to suspend the
Ram temple movement, by asserting, “There is no question of
withdrawing our support to the VHP. Whatever the VHP is doing is in
the interests of the nation, in the interests of Hindus.” [See
Box 6]
At Godhra on the 27th February itself
official rhetoric confirmed the demonology which informed the post-Godhra
anti-Muslim carnage. The burning of the Sabarmati Express bogie was
labeled a premeditated and heinous enemy act, carried out by
notorious Pakistani agents, against devout, nationalist Hindus
including women and children, returning from worshipping Lord Rama.
Such enemies had to be taught a lesson so that they “will never
dare to repeat it.”
The centrality of the Godhra massacre as
the basis of the anti-Muslim carnage that followed was to be
repeated again and again. It was also reiterated in the State
government framed terms of reference of the Justice K.G. Shah
enquiry into the Gujarat conflagration, in which the Godhra incident
is the central issue, and all other events are seen as flowing from
that. [See
Box 8]. <Back
To Top>
Post-Godhra Political Decisions
The Modi government decided to hasten the
post-mortems of the murdered passengers, and have their bodies
dispatched on the 27th February night itself at 10.30 PM to the
Civil Hospital, Sola, Ahmedabad. In any case, at the best of times,
the presence of the badly charred bodies and body parts would have
been provocative. In Ahmedabad, with its previous history of
communal violence and tension, such an act followed by the public
display of the remains prior to cremation, could at best be
described as reckless and foolhardy. The time of arrival of the
corpses by train was broadcast on the radio ensuring that a large
and inflamed crowd would gather at Ahmedabad station. Not
surprisingly such a crowd gathered and there was shouting of
dangerously provocative communal slogans like “khoon ka badla
khoon”. The display of the remains, the public grief and anger at
the funerals, the organisation of Ram Dhuns in different
parts of Ahmedabad, all served to fan the communal flames that
seared the city and the State, and simmer till today. [We will deal
with this decision in more detail in Section
3 below].
Earlier in the day, the VHP announced a
bandh on the next day, 28th February, in protest over the Godhra
tragedy. Provocative leaflets, some unsigned, castigating the
Muslims and linking the attack to Pakistan were widely distributed.
Later the same day, the State BJP unit came out in support of the
bandh. Since the BJP was, and is, the ruling party this made the
bandh a virtually State sponsored affair. In the light of the
Supreme Court decision banning bandhs, this decision was illegal. In
the light of the previous history of Ahmedabad and the State, it was
ver likely to lead to communal violence. Later in the evening, there
was a meeting of senior officers with the political leadership
where, according to authoritative sources, officers were told that
they should do nothing “which would hurt Hindu sentiments.” In
the light of subsequent developments this was clearly a signal
asking the officers not to do anything to curb the bandh or those
who sought to enforce it. [See Section 3 below].
The crucial role of the VHP-called and
BJP-backed bandh cannot be underestimated. For all its tragic
consequences and its diabolical nature the attack on the Sabarmati
Express was an isolated and localised event. A Sangh Parivar bandh,
on the other hand, marked a premeditated transition from a local
riot to an organised and preplanned State-wide protest which was
bound to result in a bloodbath, especially in the light of the
political signals to officialdom to intervene minimally. As it
turned out, Feb. 28th was when the greatest damage to life and
property took place in Ahmedabad. Attacks of this kind also took
place on a lesser scale in Vadodara on that day. Furthermore, once
the attacks were allowed to happen in Ahmedabad, the capital city,
it provided the necessary signal and sanction for the systematic and
deliberate extension of targeted communal violence elsewhere in the
state including in the rural areas. This also conforms to a
historical pattern where communal violence in the capital city of
Gujarat becomes the prelude to its extension elsewhere. All this
only reinforces the decisive role played by the bandh in marking the
transition from a local incident to a full-blooded
pogrom.
This reading of the situation is borne
out by the mind set and intentions of the bandh organisers revealed
in a tape-recorded interview with Prof. Keshavram Kashiram Shastri,
96 year old Chairman of the Gujarat unit of the VHP, who justified
the communal violence arguing, “Karvan j pade, karvan j
pade [it had to be done, it had to be done]. We don’t like
it, but we were terribly angry. Lust and anger are blind.” He
further said the rioters were “kelvayela Hindu chokra”
[well bred Hindu boys]. He also linked all the events to Godhra; “Our
boys were charged because in Godhra women and children were burnt
alive. The crowd was spontaneous. All of them were not VHP people.”
He went on to say, “In villages all these people who were angry
are not our people. They are angry because Hindutva was attacked.
This is an outburst, a tremendous outburst that will be difficult to
roll back.”
Asked how he as a scholar and litterateur
could condone innocents being burnt alive, he replied, “The
youngsters have done even those things which we don’t like. We don’t
support it. But we can’t condemn it because they are our boys. If
my daughter does something, will I condemn it?” Repeatedly
defending the “boys” for having gone too “far,” Prof.
Shastri insisted, “We needed to do something. It’s said that
snakes that are not poisonous should keep the enemy away by hissing
once in a while.” He also affirmed his organisation’s support
clarifying that, “The VHP has formed a panel of 50 lawyers to help
release the arrested people accused of rioting and looting. None of
the lawyers will charge any fees because they believe in the RSS
ideology.” [See
Box 9]
But the attacks on Muslim properties and
persons which started in Ahmedabad and some other urban and
semi-urban areas of Gujarat on 28th February, were based on detailed
information including the possession of lists. As the NHRC Interim
Report points out there were “widespread reports and allegations
of groups of well-organized persons, armed with mobile telephones
and addresses, singling out certain homes and properties for death
and destruction in certain districts…” Gujarat VHP Chairman
Prof. Shastri claims that these lists were prepared only on February
28th morning. Even if this was true, it begs another question. What
was the data base on which basis this list was prepared, and who
prepared the basic document[s] and when? That surely could not have
been prepared for tens of thousands of Muslim properties and
residences just in one morning.
Earlier attempts at the preparation of
such lists are a matter of public record or widely reported. On
February 1st/2nd 1999, the then Director of Police [Intelligence]
P.B. Upadhyaya sent a confidential circular ordering all Police
Commissioners and district police officers to provide details
including addresses of existing Muslim organisations, their leaders,
as well as the names and addresses of Muslims participating in
certain religious activities and related matters. [See
Appendix 1] This circular, and a similar one pertaining to
Christians, was challenged in the Gujarat High Court, and withdrawn
a month later. Though this circular was withdrawn, some details
about Muslim institutions and individuals along with their
addresses, must have been collected in the intervening one month
period.
Victims and other informants claimed that
months earlier, persons claiming to represent a market survey firm
visited their establishments to collect data about ownership,
production, sales, number of employees, etc. They now believe that
this may have been a prior attempt at ethnic mapping to identify
Muslim businesses and establishments. The Gujarati language press
allegedly played its part. On the basis of their experiences of
earlier riots a number of Muslim entrepreneurs gave non-Muslim,
mainly Hindu, names to their establishments, so that these were not
readily identified as Muslim. It was claimed that some eight months
earlier, Sandesh had published an article in which it listed
many such establishments pointing out that despite their names these
were Muslim owned. The rioters however, also attacked establishments
that had Muslim ‘sleeping partners,’ a fact not widely known. It
would appear therefore, that the mob leaders had access to
government records from the sales tax/excise departments and the
like, not normally available to the average citizen.
Another fact that appears to indicate
prior planning for a communal attack according to informants is the
collection of liquefied petroleum gas [LPG] gas cylinders. It is
claimed that for some two weeks before February.28th, LPG cylinders
were in short supply in Ahmedabad, and middle class consumers had to
book them and stay in queue. But the rioters who took over Ahmedabad
from February 28th were armed with thousands of LPG gas cylinders,
obviously collected in advance, which they used to blow up Muslim
commercial establishments and residences in the days that followed.
These LPG cylinders are bulky and heavy metal cylinders that can
only be transported by medium or heavy vehicles. The fact that such
vehicles [including tempos and trucks], were available along with
the much sought after LPG cylinders appears to indicate prior
planning of some weeks, not to speak of days.
Taken together, all the available
evidence including media reports, the reports of informants,
eyewitnesses and others, appears to indicate a carefully planned
attack over time on Muslim properties and persons throughout the
State, beginning with Ahmedabad, with State connivance. The attack,
it would appear, was planned well before February 27th. The ghastly
events of Godhra appear to have merely provided the trigger for an
anti-Muslim pogrom prepared well in advance. In that sense, the
tragedy in Godhra is merely a coincidence. The premeditated and
focussed attack on Gujarati Muslims was already planned, awaiting a
trigger or pretext. The unexpected carnage in Godhra on February
27th unfortunately, provided that convenient trigger. <Back
To Top>
Section 3:
State Complicity?
Penetration of the Gujarat State
The BJP, RSS, VHP, Bajrang Dal and
associated organisations had allegedly penetrated State institutions
and organisations during the BJP rule in Gujarat. For example, in
the Home Guards, it is claimed that there was widespread recruitment
of Sangh Parivar activists and sympathisers, in the thousands.
Promotions, postings and transfers in all government institutions or
those influenced by it, favoured Sangh activists and sympathisers,
and conversely punished those officers or ranks who were neutral and
secular. In the police, for example, postings and transfers up to
the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police are decided upon by the
Director General of Police [DGP]. But in Gujarat, these postingsare
decided upon by the local Sangh leadership, including MLAs, who
communicate their recommendations that are then implemented by the
bureaucracy on the instructions of the concerned Minister. The DGP
has hardly any role. At the higher level of posts of Superintendent
of Police and above, powers are concentrated at the Ministerial
level.
In the police, as probably in other
services, there is apparently an informal three-fold classification
by the Sangh Parivar of government servants. The first category are
sympathisers or members, the second are of those considered neutral
or harmless, while the third are of those considered hostile. This
classification governs rewards or punishments in the service and all
are aware of that. The mass transfers of police officers in March
2002, including of officers who through their prompt and decisive
action had stopped and curbed communal violence, is the most recent
example of punishment for doing one’s Constitutional duty. [See
Box 10, and below]. When asked about this by a critical media, Chief
Minister Modi euphemistically referred to these transfers as “promotions.”
Conversely, officers who apparently serve
the ruling party’s interests are rewarded, and act accordingly.
Assistant Commissioner of Police P.N. Barot was entrusted on March
8th with investigating two of Ahmedabad’s bloodiest massacres,
which fell outside his earlier zone of responsibility. He declared
that the genesis of the Gulbarg Society massacre where 42 people
including former Congress MP Ehsan Jafri were killed was due to
Jafri firing “with a weapon and injured 13 persons, which provoked
the mob.” Similarly, the massacre in Naroda-Patia was because “First,
a Hindu boy, Ranjitsinh Chouhan, was stabbed to death by Muslims.
Then they killed three others by crushing them under a Matador van.
This infuriated the Hindus, leading to the massacre.” Barot was
also critical of the fact that eleven people had been named in the
FIR in the Gulbarg Society case, and five others in the Naroda-Patia
carnage, the most prominent among the accused being Bajrang Dal
activist Babu Bajrangi, who has a long criminal record. “How could
the police have identified 5-6 people in a mob of a thousand?” he
complained, echoing VHP General Secretary Jaydeep Patel who accused
the police of “falsely” implicating his men. Thus Barot not only
prejudges issues but also criticises his own colleagues, clearly
indicating the likely result of his investigations.
The RSS and VHP also control key
functionaries in the State. Chief Minister Modi is an RSS pracharak.
Minister of State for Home Zadaphia is a VHP activist. The Governor
of Gujarat, who has not seen fit to send a report on what is
happening in the State to the Centre, S.S. Bhandari is also an RSS
leader. Such examples can be multiplied, but these will suffice to
indicate the penetration of the state apparatus and government
machinery by the Sangh Parivar. All governments are political, but
the penetration by the RSS, a shadowy and publicly unaccountable
organisation, is a specific phenomenon that requires careful and
painstaking investigation, which is however, outside the scope of
this report.
As a consequence, the Gujarat government
functioned not as a Constitutionally bound, non-partisan and
independent body, but one controlled by, and answerable to the Sangh Parivar.
The role and functioning of the Gujarat government, therefore, is
directly determined by its penetration by the Sangh Parivar
including its most extremist elements the VHP and Bajrang Dal. This
fact underlies the conduct of the Gujarat government before, during
and after, the peak period of communal violence in the State during
February-March 2002.
<Back
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Erosion of the Bureaucracy and the Governmental
System
The politicisation of the governmental
machinery especially the bureaucracy led inevitably to the erosion
of the functions and powers of the government machinery. As in the
case of police deployment, decision-making powers were
illegitimately transferred from police officials to the Sangh
Parivar thereby eroding the powers, neutrality and accountability of
the government machinery. A very substantial number of officers and
staff instead of being responsible to their direct superiors and
governed by service rules, traditions and precedents, became
politicised and partisan, answerable to the Sangh Parivar. This
process also undercuts the system of checks and balances crucial to
the functioning of the governmental machinery. Checks on officers
like their superiors, supervisory departments, service codes, public
scrutiny including that by the elected Assembly all get get
displaced by the unaccountable and unconstitutional control by the
Sangh Parivar.
This erosion of the governmental
machinery adversely affected its efficiency. Functionaries instead
of concentrating on their official functions were unduly concerned
of the impact of their actions, or inaction, on the Sangh
leadership. Since crucial personnel matters like promotions,
postings, transfers and awards depended not so much on meritorious
performance but partisan appreciation, the qualitative functioning
of the government apparatus was negatively affected. This factor had
a major impact on the functioning of the government machinery during
this crisis, and its inadequacies and failures. <Back
To Top>
State Government Complicity?
Failure in
Godhra
The NHRC has pointed out the “serious
failure of intelligence and action by the State Government [that]
marked the events leading to the Godhra tragedy and the subsequent
deaths and destruction that occurred.” In Section 1 above, we have
seen how reports of communally motivated misbehaviour in the
Sabarmati Express had been reported in the media as early as
February 25th e.g. in the Jan Morcha [Faizabad]. Given
Gujarat’s communal history and, in particular, the volatility of
Godhra, this alone should have led the administration to take
precautionary measures including the deployment of sufficient police
forces on the train, and at the railway stations including Godhra.
In any event, the government should have known about the returning
kar sewaks from Ayodhya, since the BJP currently rules in both the
Gujarat and UP governments. In view of the sensitivity of the
Ayodhya issue, there should have been much more police bandobast,
which if it had been in place would have ensured that the tragedy
did not occur.
According to our reconstruction of
events, the trouble started at the station itself where stone
throwing took place. By all accounts there was a clash. This should
have alerted the police forces including the GRF, who knowing the
character of Godhra and the volatility of Signal Faliya, should have
taken preventive action immediately. Further, Cabin A where the
train stopped for the second and final time, is less than a
kilometre away and the whole area is clearly visible. A crowd
gathering there could easily be observed and could only have meant
trouble. The police could, and should, have been there in a matter
of minutes.
In case the official version, that the
tragedy was premeditated and ISI-inspired is given credence, then
the intelligence lapse is much more serious. How could such a
premeditated plot have escaped the notice of the intelligence
agencies? If the fire bombs, petrol and weapons were collected and
stored over time and other preparations made over a period, why was
this not detected, particularly when tensions were known to be high
over the VHP programme in Ayodhya?
Under any construction of the events,
there have been very serious lapses by the administration and
police. There is one aspect of the formal procedures of intelligence
gathering that goes some way to explain the intelligence lapses.
Both State and Central intelligence agencies have as a matter of
routine maintained regular surveillance of certain organizations
deemed to require such watching in the name of internal security.
These have included certain fundamentalist religious organizations.
On the watch-list are also certain extremist cults or political
groupings deemed to belong to the far right (e.g. Anand Margis) or
far left (e.g. certain Naxalite groups). However, the rise to power
of the Sangh (through the BJP) at the Centre and in Gujarat has
meant that as far as central intelligence agencies and those of
Gujarat state are concerned, regular surveillance of the activities
of the RSS, VHP, Bajrang Dal though prevalent in the past would now
appear to have been dropped. This could be one major reason why no
tabs were kept, as they should have been, on the activities of the
kar sevaks on the Sabarmati Express. <Back
To Top>
The Post-Godhra events & the February 28th VHP
Bandh
The government’s decision to swiftly
transfer the bodies of the Godhra victims to Ahmedabad and elsewhere
and to allow public funerals was incendiary. The ghastly condition
of the charred bodies and remains was bound to cause public grief,
revulsion and anger. In a communally polarised State like Gujarat,
the outbreak of communal mobilisation and violence as a result of
this should have been easily anticipated. Large crowds were allowed
to collect to receive the bodies at Ahmedabad railway station and
then to take them in a public procession. Even on the journey from
Godhra to Ahmedabad which passed through Vadodara, there were press
reports of at least two stabbings at the Vadodara railway station
itself.
This act was compounded by the government’s
decision to allow the February 28th Bandh. At a time when communal
passions were aroused by the Godhra incidents and the funerals of
the victims, a bandh was certainly going to provoke violence. Not
only did the government not dissuade the VHP from calling the bandh,
it instead went ahead and joined it. The political leadership’s
advice to the officers not to do anything during the bandh that
would hurt “Hindu sentiments” was a transparent attempt to
ensure that the bandh supporters were subjected to minimum
administrative and police restraint.
Since it was clear that an immediate
post-Godhra bandh could only lead to communal violence, the Chief
Minister should have forced the VHP to withdraw the bandh, failing
which he should have suppressed it by deploying the entire might of
the State and requisitioning extra forces from outside. He clearly
failed to do so, and instead did the very opposite. By doing this
the VHP and Gujarat government, in effect, prepared the grounds for
the riots. <Back
To Top>
Police
Partisanship
The NHRC notes that the communal
marauders were widely reported to have been “singling out certain
homes and properties for death and destruction in certain
districts-sometimes within view of police stations and personnel…”
Reportedly in many cases, including the massacres in Gulbarg society
in which former Congress MP Ehsan Jafri was brutally slain, and in
Naroda-Patia where more than 80 people died [unofficial figures are
much higher], the police have been accused of having been partisan
and anti-Muslim. No satisfactory explanation has been given for the
inordinate police delay in intervening in Gulbarg society, despite
Jafri’s incessant requests for help. Some observers say that Jafri’s
spirited criticism of Chief Minister Modi during the latter’s
campaign in the Rajkot Assembly by-election, was a factor in the
police’s persistent lack of response. [See
Box 2]. In Naroda-Patia, according to survivors, the State
Reserve Police [SRP] not only refused the fleeing Muslims shelter,
but tear-gassed them, forcing them towards the waiting mobs. In case
after case, Muslim victims claimed the police used force against
them, including firing, thereby providing cover and support to the
rampaging mobs. A number of victims told us that but for the police
partisanship, the toll in the Gujarat carnage would have been much
lower.
This partisanship was much greater at the
lower levels, where there appears to have been substantial
communalization of the police force. There are widespread reports of
the lower echelons of the police being especially partisan and
hostile. But efforts to get the senior officials to remedy this
parlous state of affairs seem to have failed. This situation
continues to this day. On April 3rd, The Asian Age crime
reporter in Ahmedabad Ms. Sonal Kellogg, along with the reporter of
a Surat-based daily, was beaten up by the police in the Mariam Bibi
Ni Chawli area in Gomtipur. When she complained to the Deputy
Commissioner of Police [Zone V] R.J. Savani, whom she knew quite
well, all he said was that “it might have been a mistake.” When
she protested to the Police Commissioner P.C. Pande at his office,
he was dismissive; “Don’t bother me…I don’t have time…file
a complaint if you want.” As the journalist sums up, “If
policemen can be so brutal towards journalists on duty, their
behaviour with ordinary citizens could be so much more atrocious. It
is a pity that the police in Gujarat is either a mute spectator or
it harasses and tortures innocent people.”
Senior police officials have indicated
that their hands were tied, implying that this was done by top
politicians. But this does not absolve the top police brass in
Gujarat for failing to do their duties. The maintenance of law and
order is the direct responsibility of the police force. Regardless
of what political pressures may or may not be put upon them, there
exists a structure of rules and powers that empowers the police to
ignore such political pressures, and to ensure that law and order is
maintained. This can be done through a variety of measures including
identification of likely communal hotspots, preventive
arrests and detentions on a mass scale in curfew and other areas,
back-up preparations, etc. What is more, despite a degree of
communalization of the police at lower levels, as long as the top
hierarchy of the police make it clear that the police must and will
do its duty of ensuring peace, such communal prejudices are
invariably kept firmly in check and easily subordinated to the
acceptance of the existing chain of command and operation. It is
when the top officials do not assert themselves that wrong signals
go down the line. In the case of Ahmedabad on Feb.27th there were
virtually no preventive arrests by police stations in communally
sensitive areas. [See
Box 11].
That is why instances of police
partisanship and ineptitude were not all pervasive and there are
many creditable examples of IAS and IPS officers fulfilling their
responsibilities courageously and effectively in Gujarat during this
period. The NHRC cites the Gujarat government’s Report to it
noting “that many instances were recorded in the Report of prompt
and courageous action by District Collectors, Commissioners and
Superintendents of Police and other officers to control the violence…”
But the NHRC also points out that “the Report itself reveals that
while some communally-prone districts succeeded in controlling the
violence, other districts-sometimes less prone to such violence
succumbed to it.” Thus where decisive and capable officers
intervened, the communal holocaust could be averted. The fact it was
not in the capital Ahmedabad, was not due to lack of force but
politically-motivated ineptitude. It should be noted that the Police
Commissioner in Ahmedabad commanded a total of 10,000 men including
3,000 armed men, along with 16 companies of SRP. Yet mobs of up to
5,000 and more men were allowed to run amuck, loot, rape, beat,
murder while the police stood by, when it did not actually abet the
mobs. As one senior police officer told us, the problem was
"not lack of force, but lack of will.”
This lack of political will has also
affected investigation. Victims claim that for the most part, the
police are not registering FIRs. When they do they avoid writing
specific names of alleged wrong doers thereby defeating the purpose
at the very outset. Further, they cite lesser offenses, for example,
writing the charge of rioting instead of murder. As the instance of
ACP Barot cited above shows, the investigating officers are often
biased to begin with. The NHRC has clearly noted this and related
factors: “numerous allegations have been made both in the media
and to the team of the Commission…that FIRs…were being distorted
or poorly recorded, and that senior political personalities were
seeking to ‘influence’ the working of police stations by their
presence within them, the Commission is constrained to observe that
there is a widespread lack of faith in the integrity of the
investigating process and the ability of those conducting
investigations.” <Back
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Role of the Sangh Parivar
The primary responsibility for the
communal conflagration rests with the Sangh Parivar. It provided the
ideological, political and administrative leadership and backbone
for the tragic events in Gujarat. In Godhra, but for the provocation
by the VHP kar sewaks, the tragic events that triggered off the
State-wide holocaust would not have occurred, though that does not
justify the mob’s murderous response. The Sangh Parivar sought to
capitalise publicly in regard to the funerals of the Godhra dead in
ways that further inflamed communal passions. The VHP and other
Hindutva groups circulated inflammatory pamphlets thereby helping to
create the communal polarisation necessary for the ensuing
mobilisation and mayhem. [See Box
5 and Appendix
2]. These pamphlets and other propaganda methods were unlawful
and actionable. But to date, since cadres and leaders of the VHP and
Bajrang Dal are also BJP leaders and legislators, no action has been
taken despite extensive media coverage and criticism. No other
organisation indulging in such disruptive and illegal ideological
propaganda would have been given such latitude, much less
support.
Sangh Parivar leaders were repeatedly
identified by victims and other informants as instigating and
leading the marauding mobs. This is why in the few instances where
individual names have been recorded in the FIRs, these include Sangh
Parivar activists. The media has reported that for crucial hours on
February 28th from around Noon to 4.30 PM, two Ministers, Health
Minister Ashok Bhatt and Urban Development Minister I.K. Jadeja were
present in the Ahmedabad City and Gandhinagar State Police Control
Rooms, respectively. Minister Bhatt was reportedly present when
former MP Jafri called for help. Most importantly, though the
situation was clearly out of control, the State government delayed
in calling in the Army. Even after the Army was called in on
February 28th night, its deployment was delayed till the next
afternoon. Even then, it is reported, it received insufficient
police support and intelligence. The fact that a sympathetic Central
government deemed it fit to send Defence Minister George Fernandes
to oversee the army deployment, is a measure of their lack of faith
in the State’s leadership to adequately utilise the Army.
The bias of the Sangh Parivar is
highlighted by the fact that it wanted to compensate the victims of
the Godhra violence with Rs. 2 lakhs, in contrast to the Rs. 1 lakh
offered to victims in the post-Godhra violence. This was reversed
only after representatives of the families bereaved by the violence
in Godhra agreed to equality of compensation at Rs. 1 lakh. This, it
has been reported, was made possible because of private assurances
of separate financial help by the VHP to the said families. The NHRC
commenting on the initially proposed discriminatory compensation,
strongly noted that “the issue raised impinged seriously on the
provisions of the Constitution contained in Articles 14 and 15,
dealing respectively with equality before the law and equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India, and the
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste,
sex or place of birth.” The imposition of the Prevention of
Terrorism Ordinance [POTO] only against the accused in the Godhra
incident also smacked of bias. Both decisions were only reversed
after considerable public outcry, and Central Government
intervention.
Biases are also indicated by the fact,
which the NHRC has noted, that prior to its visit no senior
political leaders nor high level officers had visited many Muslim
refugee camps. Work has started in some camps like Shah-e-Alam only
when it became known that the Prime Minister would be visiting it.
The procedure for estimating and providing compensation also started
around that time. When it became known that the Prime Minister would
not be visiting some camps, work there, according to media reports,
was quickly abandoned. Notwithstanding the Prime Minister’s
instructions and sustained Opposition demands, no rehabilitation
work has started though more than a month has lapsed since tens of
thousands of Muslims entered dozens of refugee camps. Given the
scale of the devastation and the large numbers of people involved,
rehabilitation work, to be effective, should have commenced much
earlier.
The most important role of the Sangh
Parivar has been in suborning the administration to carry out its
ideological and political agenda. The control of the Gujarat
government was crucial for the Hindutva forces. Without it they
could not have planned, instigated, mobilised, and implemented the
communal pogrom, and then protected its activists who participated
in these activities from legal and societal retribution. It is
noteworthy that at no stage of the early communal violence did Chief
Minister Modi make sustained public appeals to Hindu groups to
eschew violence and live in amity with their Muslim
neighbours.
The role of the BJP leadership in the
ruling NDA coalition in the Union government has been crucial.
Despite unprecedented violence, loss of life and property and
colossal damage to the State’s economy, the BJP central leadership
has gone out of its way to defend the Modi government. Though Home
Minister Advani’s Gandhinagar constituency includes some of the
worst affected areas, he paid a brief visit some days after the
violence erupted. The Prime Minister’s own visit was more than a
month after the violence started, and that to just for a day. In a
tragedy of such dimensions more visible concern is normally
displayed and expected. It is noteworthy, that in States marked by
much less violence and disturbance, like in Manipur last year after
the extension of the Naga cease-fire to the Manipur hill districts,
the Centre imposed President’s Rule under Article 356. This
sustained and unrelenting support has encouraged and enabled the
Modi government to persist with its communal and partisan policies.
Additionally, both these governments have failed to fulfill
Constitutional requirements.
Two Gujarat High Court judges, one a
serving judge Justice M. H. Kadri and another a retired judge and
former Chairman, MRTP Commission, Justice A.N. Divecha, had to leave
their own homes on 28th February, on the advice of the Chief Justice
of the High Court, because adequate police protection was not
available. Justice A.P. Ravani, former Chief Justice, Rajasthan High
Court, in his deposition to the NHRC of 21st March 2002, has stated
that he advised Justice Kadri that for him “to shift from his
official residence for the reason that he is not given full
protection would amount to [an] insult to the independence of the
judiciary and also an insult to the secular philosophy of the
Constitution.” [See Box
7, and
Appendix 3]. The NHRC in its comment on this event noted that
the “pervasive sense of insecurity prevailing in the State…extended
to all segments of society, including to two Judges of the High
Court of Gujarat, one sitting and the other retired who were
compelled to leave their homes because of the vitiated atmosphere.
There could be no clearer evidence of the failure to control the
situation.”
From all these instances it would appear
that there has been a Constitutional breakdown of law and order in
Gujarat attracting Article 355, and obligating the use of Article
356. This is indicated by the NHRC when it declared that the State’s
responsibility should be gauged by “the failure to protect the
life, liberty, equality and dignity of the people of Gujarat.”
<Back
To Top>
Conclusions
1] The events in Gujarat do not
constitute a communal riot. Barring the tragic attack at Godhra on
February 27th which was a communal riot, the bulk of the violence
that followed was state-backed and one-sided violence against
Muslims tantamount to a deliberate pogrom.
2] For the first time since 1969, the
communal violence in Gujarat has assumed a comprehensive State-wide
dimension. But unlike 1969, several new areas hitherto unaffected by
communal tension (both in cities and in the state as a whole),
including large swathes of the rural areas, have been affected by
communal tension marked by attacks by the largely tribal people,
often from neighbouring villages, on the Muslim
minority.
3] The casualties have been very high.
While the official estimate of deaths is below 800, unofficial
estimates start at 2,000 and go even higher. A major reason for this
underestimation is that the deaths in rural areas have not all been
reported as entire settlements have been wiped out, with no one left
to report the losses to the police, which, as shown above, has
generally been reluctant to file FIRs even in the urban and
semi-urban areas. In view of the Administration’s attempt to
minimize the violence claiming that it was under control within 72
hours, it would be interested in understating the actual extent of
casualties.
4] Certain crucial aspects of the
carrying out of the pogrom required systematic planning well in
advance of the Godhra incident. The lists the rioters possessed and
used must have been compiled over time. The targeting of Muslim
homes, institutions, establishments and shrines was very precise and
accurate. Even when there was only one Muslim shop or home in a
congested Hindu-dominated area, it was attacked, ransacked and
burnt. Businesses that had Hindu or non-Muslim names, were
identified and targeted along with others in which Muslims were
minority or sleeping partners. The mobs were huge, at times several
thousand strong. They were brought in buses and trucks. Vehicles
were also used to ferry thousands of LPG gas cylinders, which in
turn were widely used as explosives to destroy property. There must
have been official connivance to release such large quantities of
LPG gas cylinders. In the weeks before the outbreak Ahmedabad was
experiencing a widely reported shortage of such cylinders. Vehicles
were also used to transport looted goods. The leaders of the mobs
allegedly had mobile phones as well as water bottles, and regularly
communicated with others, presumably including their political
bosses.
5] It is a measure of the virtual
breakdown of large areas of police functioning that intelligence
reports of this Hindutva planning were either not compiled or
ignored by higher ups. These types of preparations should not have
gone unnoticed since, at the very least, hundreds must have been
involved. Further, this mass movement of men, materials and vehicles
could easily have been curbed by decisive police action, which would
have led to a dramatic fall in casualties, rape and destruction of
property. Virtually no preventive arrests were made further
emboldening the mobs. Later arrests reportedly had a
disproportionate number of Muslims. In sharp contrast, in places
like Kacchch, Surat, Amreli, etc., where tough, decisive and
extensive action was taken by the administration and police, the
situation was kept under control. This would indicate that the
breakdown of law and order in Ahmedabad, Vadodara, and elsewhere was
a consequence of the politicisation of the administration and
police.
6] The suborning of large sections of the
administration and police to permit, and in numerous cases to
facilitate, the Hindutva agenda, was critical for the spread,
intensity and persistence of the communal violence. As was the blind
eye turned to the provocative propaganda by sections of the Gujarati
media, Sangh Parivar affiliates notably the VHP, and at times by
State functionaries themselves. The government statements
immediately after Godhra virtually accusing the Ghanchis of Singal
Faliya of acting as Pakistani ISI agents, and their decision to
publicise the transporting of the charred bodies to Ahmedabad for
public funeral, can only be seen as a cynical attempt to foment
communal tension and hysteria essential for the attacks that
inevitably followed. This was compounded by the State government’s
sanction and support for the VHP bandh and their signal to the
bureaucracy and police to minimise their intervention. Since then
the government has systematically tried to cover up, minimise, and
even justify, the extent of violence, while protecting the guilty
and those guilty of dereliction of duty. This is why the events of
February-March 2002 can only be called a state-sponsored
pogrom.
7] Instead of intervening and taking
decisive action against the State government, the Central government
has chosen to minimize the seriousness of what has happened, with
senior Central government leaders early on alleging without proof,
ISI involvement in Godhra. Without this sustained and consistent
support, the Modi government could not have continued in power or
have been emboldened to continue with its bloody,
anti-Constitutional and anti-national activities. Since the defence
of the Constitutional order is its primary duty, the Union
government itself has failed to fulfill its primary duties, and
uphold its oath of office.
8] What has happened in Gujarat is not
only a gruesome tragedy for that State, or a national tragedy as the
Prime Minister keeps saying. It is much more than that. If those
guilty, whether for the Godhra killings or for the carrying out and
covering up of the state-sponsored pogrom are allowed to go
unpunished, it will have severe consequences for the continuation of
India as a secular, multi-cultural democracy. If minorities along
with all those who disagree with Hindutva fanatics, (together the
large majority of the people of India), can be attacked in this
manner then a secular India cannot survive. <Back
To Top>
Recommendations
1] In view of the Constitutional
breakdown in Gujarat, [patent in the concerted and systematic
challenge mounted to the secular foundation of the polity; in the
failure to protect the life liberty and safety of a sitting High
Court judge belonging to the minority community; in the monumental
breakdown of law and order, in the very heart of the state capital
and elsewhere; and in the large scale looting, arson and killing to
which the minority community was allowed to be subjugated
systematically], under the obligations enjoined on it under Article
355, the Union government should impose President’s Rule under
Article 356.
2] During President’s Rule, stringent
and extensive measures must be undertaken to depoliticise and
decommunalise the bureaucracy and police at all levels. The
impartial and efficient functioning of the Gujarat administration
and police must be restored in accordance with the provisions and
injunctions of the Constitution.
3] The K.G. Shah Commission of Inquiry
should be replaced by a Commission of Inquiry headed by a sitting
Supreme Court judge and including one or more sitting High Court
judges, with more extensive terms of reference similar to that of
the earlier Justice Jagmohan Reddy Inquiry
Commission.
4] Special courts should be set up to try
the guilty, including leading politicians. CBI inquiries be
instituted against senior police officers and bureaucrats suspected
of dereliction of duty.
5] Recommendations of the National Police
Commission [1979-81] to establish the autonomy of the police and
free it from undue political control should be accepted and
implemented immediately.
6] Immediate measures for relief and
rehabilitation. Peace committees must be set up in all localities,
including unaffected ones. These committees should be involved in
creating a conducive atmosphere for the victims to return home, once
their residences are reconstructed. Adequate compensation should be
given for the reconstruction of commercial and industrial
establishments. The necessary rules may be revised, and the Centre
can give the necessary financial support. When this is not possible,
peace committees in the area of relocation should be involved. All
efforts must be made to prevent further ghettoisation of the Muslim
community.
7] In view of the trauma, victims
especially women and children have suffered, free medical, including
psychiatric, care should be provided. As there has apparently been
widespread rape, including of girl children, special counselling by
medical personnel as well as by social workers should be
organised.
8] The role of sections of the media,
particularly the Gujarati language press, should be investigated by
the Press Council, and deterrent and remedial action be taken.
<Back
To Top>
Section 1
Box 1: A History of Communal Riots in
Gujarat
After independence, Gujarat witnessed its
first major communal riot involving large-scale massacres, arson and
looting in 1969. The riots took a toll of over 1,000 lives and
property worth crores of Rupees was destroyed. During the years 1974
to 1980, other issues preoccupied Gujarati society. The 1984
anti-reservation agitation also took something of a communal turn as
this was one way of reducing the polarisation that was otherwise
taking place between upper caste and lower caste Hindus. During the
nineties, the Ram Janmabhoomi issue began to occupy the
centre of the stage. L. K. Advani’s Rath Yatra in 1990 led to the
highest number of communal riots in the state. Communal passions
were raised particularly in those areas where Hindu-Muslim amity had
prevailed in the past. Violence also spread to rural areas.
Organised efforts were made in civil
society through informal channels, the print and visual media,
public lectures to provide new and more militant interpretations of
Hinduism and to promote a feeling among Hindus that as a majority
community they were being treated unjustly through ‘appeasement’
of Muslims by various ‘vested interests’. The view that Muslims
were conservative, anti-national, fundamentalist and pro-Pakistan
was systematically promoted. In some cases Hindus were even exhorted
to take up arms to defend their interests.
The BJP came to power in Gujarat in the
mid-nineties. Steady state support was extended to the activities of
organisations such as the RSS, VHP, Shiv Sena, Bajrang Dal and so
on. School curricula were modified to be in tune with the Hindutva
ideology. Anti-Christian propaganda and violence were initiated.
Efforts were made to penetrate the tribal belt where the influence
of the BJP was limited. Trishuls, swords and other weapons were
distributed at ceremonial religious functions. Training campaigns
were carried out to spread ideological messages.
Between 1987 and 1991, an estimated 106
major riots took place in Gujarat. Political rivalry and conflicts
during elections were responsible for triggering around 40 percent
of these riots. Tensions related to ‘religious processions’
triggered another approximately 22 percent of all riots. Other
triggers were personal ill-feelings, cricket matches, sudden
quarrels, love affairs between Hindu girls and Muslim boys and vice
versa, and so on. Persistent communal tensions have contributed to
the perpetuation of violence as a way of life and the emergence of
authoritarian elements in society, which seek to destroy civic
order. The mixing of politics with religion has played havoc in
Gujarat. Communal riots have often been engineered to overthrow
inconvenient state governments. Political confrontation and violence
as a way of asserting one’s presence have become established
practices in the state’s democratic polity. The sheer numerical
strength and violence of organised mobs is sometimes used to
supplant normal legal processes. Political violence in combination
with emotionally charged religious fanaticism has sought to destroy
the social fabric and to divide the people.
Since 1969, police posts have become
almost a permanent feature of the city landscape in Ahmedabad. Many
politicians move about with armed guards and vehicles to safeguard
their security from perceived enemies. Politico-administrative
institutions have been unable to contain violence firmly, fairly and
in accordance with the law. The Justice Jaganmohan Commission Report
of 1970 and the Justice Dave Commission Report in 1990, have clearly
stated that the country belongs to no single community immutably
different and separate from other sections of society. A disturbing
assessment of the current situation in Gujarat, which was widely
expressed to the members of this fact-finding mission, was that a
large section of Hindus in Gujarat have come to perceive some sort
of a ‘social sanction’ behind the infliction of wanton violence
against the minority Muslim community in the state. <Back
To Top>
Section 2
B
ox
2 : Murder Most Foul: The Death of Iqbal Ehsan Jafri and Family
Members
Among those killed and injured by
marauding mobs in Ahmedabad from February 28th onwards were
prominent Muslims as well as poor Muslim families. Some were
fortunate enough to be able to flee. This was the case with retired
Justice Akbar N. Divecha whose house was burnt down. The Special IG
of Police, A. I. Saiyed had to run for his life. The former Congress
MP, Iqbal Ehsan Jafri was burnt alive along with his family members
(barring his brave wife who managed to escape the wrath of the
marauders). He was living in the Gulbarg Society colony of
Chamanpura area in the city of Ahmedabad. Several other Muslim
families in Gulbarg Society were similarly burnt alive. By all
accounts several thousands had gathered in a mob on February 28th to
carry out looting, arson, rape and killings.
Police officials, speaking anonymously,
confirmed that Jafri had made frantic telephone calls to the
Director General of police, the Police Commissioner, the Chief
Secretary, the Additional chief Secretary (Home) and others. Three
mobile vans of the city police were on hand around Jafri’s house
but did not intervene. Our police sources further confirmed that the
MP resorted to firing in self-defence when he totally failed in his
attempts to get police assistance. At that point, the maurauders
broke into his house, and among other inhuman deeds, stripped and
raped his daughters and then burnt them alive along with their
father. It was only the Rapid Action Force (RAF) of the central
government that belatedly intervened when they arrived on the
scene. <Back
To Top>
Box 3:
Electoral Political Calculations by the BJP?
The BJP last formed the state government through its victory
in assembly elections in 1998. It came to power on the campaigning
slogan of promising freedom from “Bhook, Bhey Aur Brashtachar”,
or freedom from hunger, fear and corruption. Between 1998 and the
February 27, 2002, however, the BJP has suffered badly in elections
at all levels.
In the December 2000 elections to 6
municipal corporations, to 25 district panchayats and to the far
more numerous Taluka elections held simultaneously, the BJP lost
heavily. It lost control in almost all the district panchayat
elections. It retained four of the six municipalities but its two
losses were in the most prestigious municipalities of Ahmedabad, the
capital and Rajkot where the RSS and the Sangh has had its strongest
foothold. The BJP had held Ahmedabad corporation for the last 15
years and Rajkot for the last 25 years. The Congress party was the
biggest beneficiary of the BJP’s electoral reversals.
In September 2001 under the previous BJP
regime in the state headed by Keshubhai Patel, it lost to the
Congress in the two assembly elections held then. Narendra Modi was
brought in as chief minister of Gujarat to replace Patel shortly
after that debacle, partly to bring about a change in the BJP’s
sinking electoral fortunes. However, in the February 24, 2002
bye-elections held in three assembly seats (all held previously by
the BJP) the party lost two of them by heavy margins to the
Congress, and Modi himself was elected from the third Rajkot
constituency by a much reduced margin as compared to the previous
poll. It was widely believed, rightly or wrongly, that he could even
have lost if the Congress had fielded a stronger candidate.
The question naturally arises as to
whether there are any electoral-political considerations behind what
subsequently happened from February 28 onwards? This can only be
speculated upon. However, what is a fact is that the Gujarat state
government and party headed by Modi has, after the outbreak of
prolonged communal violence in Gujarat, wanted to hold assembly
elections before the scheduled time of February-March 2003. This is
confirmed by all the major dailies of New Delhi and elsewhere on
March 28, 2002, which reported on Modi’s visit to Delhi to meet
the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The PM is reported to have
told Modi to forget about seeking to reschedule (bring forward) the
assembly polls at this juncture and to concentrate on restoring
normalcy in the state first.
Although it is, of course, the Election
Commission that has final say on the precise timing of the next
assembly polls, the fact that Modi has sought to bring forward the
dates of the assembly elections in Gujarat clearly indicates that it
is the belief of himself and his party in the state that the BJP
will benefit from the political fall-out of the carnage that has
taken place. <Back
To Top>
Box 4 : Translation of an Article in
Sandesh
[March 1, 2002, Page 16]
FROM AMONG THOSE ABDUCTED FROM
SABARMATI EXPRESS TWO DEAD BODIES OF HINDU GIRLS FOUND NEAR KALOL IN
MUTILATED STATE
Vadodara, Thursday: The details of the
information about the dead bodies of two girls abducted from the
bogies, during the attack on the Sabarmati express, yesterday, found
in a mutilated and terribly disfigured form, near a pond in Kalol,
has added fuel to the already volatile situation of tension, not
only in Panchmahal, but in the whole State.
As part of a cruel inhuman act that would
make even a devil weep, the breasts of both the dead bodies had been
cut. Seeing the dead bodies one knows that the girls had been raped
again and again, perhaps many times. There is a speculation that
during this act itself the girls might have died.
The police, however, have kept quiet and
have not spoken about this sensitive event. On account of that,
various speculations during an already tense situation are like
adding ghee to the fire.
According to the talk heard during the
night one more dead body of a girl, also in a terribly mutilated
form, had been found. After having raped and mutilated, the body of
the woman was set on fire with petrol. Is there no limit to the
lust?<Back
To Top>
Box 5: Translation of a VHP Leaflet
[VHP leaflet, Jai Shri Ram]
Wake up! Arise! Think!
Enforce!
Save the country! Save the
religion!
Economic boycott is the only solution!
The anti-national elements use the money earned from the Hindus to
destroy us!
They buy arms! They molest our sisters
and daughters! The way to break the backbone of these elements is:
An economic non-cooperation movement.
Let us resolve:
1. From now on I will not buy anything
from a Muslim shopkeeper!
2. I will not sell anything from my shop
to such elements!
3. Neither shall I use the hotels of
these anti-nationals, nor their garages!
4. I shall give my vehicles only to Hindu
garages! From a needle to gold, I shall not buy anything made by
Muslims, neither shall we sell them things made by us!
5. Boycott whole-heartedly films in which
Muslim hero-heroines act! Throw out films produced by these
anti-nationals!
6. Never work in offices of Muslims! Do
not hire them!
7. Do not let them buy offices in our
business premises, nor sell or rent out houses to them in our
housing societies, colonies or communities.
8. I shall certainly vote, but only for
him who will protect the Hindu nation.
9. I shall be alert to ensure that our
sisters-daughters do not fall into the ‘love-trap’ of Muslim
boys at school-college-workplace.
10. I shall not receive any education or
training from a Muslim teacher.
Such strict economic boycott will
throttle these elements! It will break their backbone! Then it will
be difficult for them to live in any corner of this country.
Friends, begin this economic boycott from today! Then no Muslim will
raise his head before us! Did you read this leaflet? Then make ten
photocopies of it, and distribute it to our brothers. The curse of
Hanumanji [be] on him who does not implement this, and distribute it
to others! The curse of Ramchandraji also be on him! Jai
Shriram!
A true Hindu patriot! <Back
To Top>
Section 3
Box 6: Selected Quotes From the
Press
1. March 1, 2002 (Times of
India, Delhi Edition )
Chief Minister Narendra Modi stated: “I’m
absolutely satisfied with how the police and the government has
handled the backlash. I’m happy the violence has been largely
contained.”
Narendra Modi said that: “The five
crore people of Gujarat have shown remarkable restraint under grave
provocation.”
On Ehsan Jafri’s murder, Narinder Modi
said: “Before Congress leader Jafri’s House was set ablaze,
reports claim that there was firing on the mob from inside his
residence. (It is) preplanned and the incident seems to be a
terrorist activity.”
2. March 2, 2002 (Times of
India, Delhi Edition)
On the violence after Godhra, Modi
stated: “Every action has an equal and opposite reaction.”
3. March 4, 2002 (Indian
Express, Ahmedabad Edition)< |
